‘A whole generation has grown up independent of Russia’ Expert Thomas de Waal explains the politics behind Moscow’s waning influence in the South Caucasus
Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan have gone from bad to worse this year. Tensions first flared back in December, when an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger jet crashed in western Kazakhstan — a tragedy widely blamed on a Russian anti-aircraft missile. Seven months later, the two countries are now locked in a full-blown diplomatic crisis following the deaths of two Azerbaijani citizens in Russian custody.
“It’s very important to us that Russians be treated with respect in Azerbaijan,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Monday. But Baku isn’t backing down and is preparing to take Moscow to international court. At the same time, Armenia is, for the first time, building ties with both Azerbaijan and Turkey independently of Russia — while neighboring Georgia is moving in the opposite direction, deepening its economic ties with Moscow. British journalist and leading Caucasus expert Thomas de Waal explains how Russia’s role in the region is shifting and what each country hopes to gain from the emerging new order.
The following interview has been edited and abridged for length and clarity.
— Against the backdrop of the current crisis between Moscow and Baku, journalists and analysts have begun writing about Russia losing influence not just in Azerbaijan, but across the South Caucasus. Has Russia’s standing in the region really weakened? And if so, when and how gradually did it start?
— Russia has lost influence in the South Caucasus. Obviously, it’s been a gradual process. We’re talking 35 years since these countries became independent. And obviously, the mental idea Russia has of these countries — that they are still part of its near abroad, still part of its sphere of influence — does not match the reality. These are countries where a whole generation has now grown up independent of Russia. Russian language use is declining. These countries have their own links across the world.
Azerbaijan’s strongest ally is Turkey. Georgia, at least until recently, had very strong European links. Armenia’s closest ally is France. So Russia is one player amongst many. It still has many levers in the South Caucasus. But those are mostly now economic levers, and they’re negative ones. Russia can influence Armenia by cutting off the gas, but it’s not going to win the love and support of the Armenian people by doing that.
I think the crucial moment was the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which diverted a lot of [Russia’s] resources. It lost Russia respect in the South Caucasus. And I think the partnerships became more equal between the countries of the South Caucasus and Russia. They understood that Russia needed new economic partners because its routes to the West were shut down.
And another important factor is that Russia has now lost the big lever of the Karabakh conflict. Previously, Russia could always play Armenia against Azerbaijan against each other. But Karabakh is now lost, which is a big tragedy for the people of Karabakh. But one result is that Russia cannot use this lever anymore. And that gives both Armenia and Azerbaijan — Azerbaijan in particular — a greater chance to have their own strategic autonomy.
— Why don’t there seem to be any major attempts at negotiation in the current crisis between Russia and Azerbaijan?
— I think both countries need each other. Azerbaijan has a big diaspora in Russia — possibly up to two million people. Russia is an incredibly important neighbor. Russia needs Azerbaijan for economic links and as a transport route to the south. They were increasing rail and road infrastructure from Russia into Azerbaijan. They both need each other to cooperate in the North Caucasus. Dagestan is a very weak point for Russia and it borders Azerbaijan. They don’t want Dagestan to become unstable.
But obviously, there are also issues of national pride and political legitimacy. And neither leader wants to be seen to be making concessions to the other. Azerbaijan wants to be treated more like an equal partner and less like a vassal to Russia.
But at another level, I think we could say there’s an element of theater here. The two leaders know each other extremely well. They’ve known each other for 20 years. Just last summer, Putin made a state visit to Azerbaijan. He spent a lot of time personally with [President] Ilham Aliyev and his wife. At some point, I expect one of the two to pick up the phone, and they will have a conversation, and they will de-escalate this crisis. Still, the current crisis is an indication of the strength that Azerbaijan feels. And it’s an attempt to rebalance the relationship between these two countries.
— What could be the result of Russia losing influence in the South Caucasus?
— I think the most significant development in recent times is the fact that the two leaders [Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev] met in Abu Dhabi on July 10, and they met at their own initiative. It wasn’t part of an international summit. It was a bilateral meeting without mediators. United Arab Emirates was the host, but it wasn’t the mediator.
I think this is a positive, healthy sign that these two countries are no longer saying, “We can’t talk to one another without a big brother.” Obviously, every mediator has its own agenda for a conflict. So it’s ideal for the two conflict parties to talk to one another to mediate directly. So I think that’s a positive step. And obviously, Russia is cut out of this.
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And even more significant, perhaps, is the fact that the two countries are now talking about transport and connectivity routes, the so-called “Zangezur corridor,” without the Russians. Because if you recall, in 2021, a trilateral government commission was formed by Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, with deputy prime ministers to talk about transport and connectivity. According to the November 2020 trilateral agreement that ended the 2020 war, the FSB was in charge as the oversight. Now, both sides are basically rejecting that.
The Armenians don’t want the Russians in this key part of their territory. Azerbaijan is now also rejecting that. I think this is probably one of the reasons why this row between Azerbaijan and Russia is escalating. As for whether another country will step into the vacuum, it likely won’t be just a single country that does so. The Americans are activating their efforts, but I don’t think they should have the illusion that they’re a big player in the South Caucasus. They’re one amongst many players. The European Union is there, Turkey is obviously a strong player, but I think there’s no single outside actor that’s the big brother in the region now. And I think that’s healthy.
— Could the U.S. proposal to lease the ‘Zangezur corridor’ for 100 years help move the negotiations forward? And how successful can talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan be without third-party mediation?
— Let’s make a distinction between the mediation and facilitation. I don’t think they want direct mediation. What they want is facilitation, or assistance. That’s what Europeans have offered for several years with technical issues and providing ideas. The U.S. is now stepping in. I think this has a positive side and negative side. The U.S is obviously a big international player; it has weight. But I don’t think the specific proposal we’re seeing so far will be accepted by either party, which is the idea of a U.S. lease of the territory.
This is possibly a result of the Trump administration’s approach. They don’t have sophisticated diplomats. Everything is a deal. And in particular, I don’t think that kind of arrangement will work. But maybe some version of that arrangement is being discussed that’s more international — some international consortium taking charge of that route, which could have Europeans, Turks, Americans, Arabs. But I don’t think either Armenia or Azerbaijan wants Russians or Iranians in on that route for different reasons.
— If peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is so disadvantageous for Russia, is it trying to block the deal?
— Obviously, a bilateral peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan without Russians in the “Zangezur corridor” is not favorable for Russia. I think Russia will activate its attempts to stop this kind of deal and insist on a more Russian one. And another significant development is the appointment of [Kremlin First Deputy Chief of Staff] Sergey Kiriyenko, who has acquired extra powers to deal not just with Abkhazia, but also with Armenia. And we’re seeing more aggressive tactics. A few weeks ago, in Armenia, [Prime Minister] Pashinyan reported a coup d’etat involving two bishops. And it’s not clear if they were just pro-Russia or if Russia was behind them, but certainly there’s a Russian element in that plot.
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So yes, we’re seeing Russia and people like Kiriyenko increasing their efforts to get rid of the prime minister. And obviously, the prime minister has an election next June. And he wants not to completely free Armenia of its dependence on Russia, but certainly to lessen Armenia’s dependence on Russia. I think we will see Russian efforts to interfere in that election.
But I think the trouble for Russia is they only really have one chance. If they try to get rid of Pashinyan by force, and that fails, that will dramatically worsen the Armenia–Russia relationship. So they basically have one chance and it’s not clear who they can depend on. Pashinyan is definitely less popular than he was before, but the main opposition candidate with Russian support, [former Armenian President and Prime Minister] Robert Kocharyan, is even more unpopular, and people do not want to go back to what they saw as rather oppressive rule under Kocharyan.
— What will Pashinyan leave behind? What do you see as the main achievements of his time in office?
— Pashinyan’s record is very mixed. He’s the man who fought the war and lost Karabakh; that’s a black mark against him. And so far, he has very little to show from his attempts to negotiate with Azerbaijan and Turkey.
He’s attempting a real mental shift in Armenia — moving away from a focus on the glorious Armenian past, what he calls historic Armenia, and instead urging the country to focus completely on building and rebuilding a state within the recognized borders of the Republic of Armenia. So that’s his big idea.
How far he succeeds with that message, I think, will depend on a few factors: the economy; how much support he gets from the outside, from Europe; and whether Azerbaijan and Turkey give him something. So those are all important factors. It’s almost one year to the election, and a lot could happen before we know the answer to that question.
— Even though Yerevan is gradually distancing itself from Moscow, Russia still has a military base in Gyumri, and Russian border guards continue to patrol Armenia’s borders. What do you see as the future of Russia’s military presence in the country?
— Under the current agreement, Russia’s military base in Gyumri is supposed to be there at least until 2044. It would be a mistake to think Armenia wants to cut all its relations with Russia. The economic dependency on Russia is still very strong. The prime minister made a point of going to [this year’s] May 9 Victory Day commemoration in Moscow. There are also many Armenian soldiers at the Gyumri base, as well as Russians; it’s a mixed base. But I don’t think it’s a priority for Armenia at the moment to get rid of that base.
I think it’s more important for Armenia to get control of its borders: to have Armenian border guards, not Russian ones, on its border with Turkey and Iran. So I think it would be a mistake to think that this is a pivot to the West. They want to build better relations with the West, but they also understand the West is further away. India is a new important partner country for them trying to build relations with Gulf states. So they’re trying to have a more balanced foreign policy without this sole dependence on one country, Russia, which I think they now believe was a big mistake for Armenia over these last 30 years.
— You recently wrote that the draft peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan is more about normalization between the states than about reconciliation between the two societies. What is the agreement missing?
— It’s not so much a peace treaty; it’s more like an agreement of normalization of relations between the two countries. In an ideal world, you would want to see a peace agreement that has elements of justice in it — one that addresses war crimes or the right of return.
Unfortunately, that’s not there. I think this is primarily because Azerbaijan, the victor in the conflict, does not want to open those issues of accountability or of justice. They want to control those processes. And I don’t think Armenia is ready for that either. One article in this agreement is about each side withdrawing or ceasing its international court cases against the other. So that channel of justice is also closed down, which is unfortunate.
I guess the hope is that once a normalization agreement is signed, diplomacy will take over from conflict. But certainly it would be a mistake to think that once a peace agreement is signed, the conflict is resolved. It just enters a new phase — a more political phase. And a lot of work will need to be done for the two societies to understand one another and to build better relations.
— While other South Caucasus countries have been distancing themselves from Russia, Georgia is actually strengthening ties. Why is this happening, and how is it possible given the lack of diplomatic relations and strong public opposition?
— Georgia is a bit of a mystery at the moment. I don’t see any kind of strategic plan from the Georgian Dream government. So I think it can only be explained by the idea that the Georgian Dream government is a small group of people who are motivated more by business than they are by geopolitical strategy, because what they are doing has spoiled relations with the West. The language and rhetoric against the West in Georgia is now stronger than it is in Azerbaijan. Even though Georgia is supposedly still a candidate country for the European Union, leading figures in the government attack European diplomats, Western diplomats, and Western politicians every day.
Recently, there was an open letter by 17 European foreign ministers expressing worry about Georgian democracy. And the response from Georgian Dream was extremely aggressive, talking about a deep state conspiracy against Georgia. So they’re hurting their relations with the West. And yet, I don’t see that they’re actually getting any concessions from Russia on [breakaway regions] Abkhazia or South Ossetia; diplomatic relations are still suspended. And I think if they were restored, there would be a big backlash from the Georgian public.
The government talks about China, but I think the China factor is a bit overestimated in Georgia. They tried to sign an agreement with China on the nuclear port, but I don’t think that’s actually finalized. Georgia seems to suddenly be isolating itself. It’s not a clever, multi-sector foreign policy; it seems to be a policy of self-isolation. I think it’s because the people in charge in Georgia are a small group. They’re a bit paranoid, and they want to stay in power. And I think they are doing informal business deals with the Russians, and maybe also with the Chinese, which is good for their group, but doesn’t really make any difference for the country as a whole.
— During last year’s mass protests against Georgia’s “foreign agents” law, you wrote that Georgian Dream’s plan was to build a “Georgian fortress” — a country with repressive capacity like Azerbaijan’s, but backed by illiberal governments in Europe. How much progress has the government made in building that “fortress” in the six months since the election?
— In the short term, they’ve been quite successful. Repression works because young demonstrators cannot afford these big fines, which can be up to 4,000 lari, or about 1,200 euros [$1,400]. It’s financially difficult to continue to protest. So protests die out, either because they are afraid or because of inertia.
They do still have a good friend in Hungary and Viktor Orbán. I think almost every week, there’s some delegation coming from Tbilisi to Budapest. They had some hopes in the Trump administration, but I don’t think that’s been very successful.
So in the short term, I think they’ve been successful. But in the long term, I don’t see where this is headed. For 30 years, Georgia built up a European trajectory, a European perspective. They’re now sabotaging that. I don’t see that they have an alternative plan, or a fortress. Azerbaijan can afford to be a fortress because it has all this big oil and gas revenues and also has a strong ally in Turkey. Georgia has neither of those things.
So Georgia is in a trap. The Georgian economy worked when it was a transit country, when they had open borders trading east, west, north, and south. And that’s not really working for them at the moment.
— The E.U. recently threatened to suspend Georgia’s visa-free travel. What are they trying to achieve, and how might that affect the domestic situation in the country?
— It would be really unfortunate if Georgians lost their visa-free travel to Europe. I think it’s used particularly by the people who are the most pro-European and who want to visit family and work there. So it will be very negative for those people. So I hope it won’t happen; I hope this is just a threat from part of the European Union.
But the Georgian government would be prepared to accept that because I think it’s a blow not so much to them, but more to the young people and to the opposition. And for the Georgian dream [voter] base, people outside Tbilisi, in the small towns and villages, Europe is not so important. I fear not having this visa-free travel to Europe would just have a polarizing effect on Georgian society and anger the pro-Europeans even more. And the rest of the people, the Georgian Dream voters, will possibly turn towards countries like Russia.
— What is Russia’s aim in its relations with Georgia?
— First of all, I think Georgia is not a big priority for Russia. Basically, there’s one man who now makes Russian foreign policy: Mr. Putin. And if he doesn’t think about Georgia, they’re quite happy with the status quo. They’re happy with the Georgian Dream government and the business links and the flights. But on the other hand, they don’t want to give up Abkhazia in particular. I think that’s an important region for them on the Black Sea, particularly when they’re seen how vulnerable Crimea is to Ukrainian drone attacks.
It’s important to have a Plan B in the Black Sea. And I think that plan B is Abkhazia, a place that you basically own. I think they will continue to try to persuade Georgian Dream to open diplomatic relations. But probably that won’t happen because that can’t really happen without any compromise on the two territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
But I think many people are quite happy with the status quo particularly, and many people are making money. Georgian Airways now has a flight to Nice in the south of France. And I don’t think it’s Georgians who are using that. Clearly what’s happening is that Russians are flying from Moscow, changing planes in Tbilisi, and then they can fly to the south of France. And we all know who those people are. That’s a very privileged, wealthy segment of Russians who still have access to their villas in the south of France. So I think a lot of people are quite happy with Russian–Georgian relations at the moment.
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Interview by Mikita Kuchinsky